El artículo plantea las conexiones entre la tesis de la banalidad del mal y la historia de la voluntad presente en La vida del espíritu. Interpreta Eichmann en Jerusalén como una obra sobre el mal burocrático, pero sobre todo como estudio acerca de la responsabilidad, tanto jurídica como moral. De la historia de la voluntad resalta tres aspectos que pueden ser puestos en conexión con el problema de la responsabilidad: la ontología de la contingencia, la idea de individualidad vinculada a (...) la voluntad y la capacidad de trascendencia y resistencia subyacentes en la teoría de Duns Escoto de la libertad como indiferencia. Por último, sugiere una vinculación entre la banalidad del mal y la ontología del bien desarrolladas en “Algunas cuestiones de filosofía moral”, de 1965-1966, la lucha contra el gnosticismo y la defensa de una relación entre moralidad e inteligibilidad del mal. (shrink)

WHAT do we mean by saying that a being, God for example, is omniscient? One way of answering this question is to translate ‘God is omniscient’ into some slightly more formalised language than colloquial English, e.g. one with variables of a number of different types, including variables replaceable by statements, and quantifiers binding thes.

Arthur Prior (1914-69) is regarded as New Zealand's greatest 20th-century philosopher. Until World War II, Prior seriously considered a career as a religious journalist, especially when traveling and living on the Continent and in England with his first wife. During these years, Prior wrote widely on theology and contemporary Christianity. In his correspondence with Ursula Bethell and Hugh Teague, Prior discusses in detail his religious and theological thoughts, including his shift from formal theological study into a (...) world of journalism and philosophy. These previously unknown letters, which cover the years from 1936 to 1941, chronicle a substantial part of a fascinating period in Prior's development, both theologically and philosophically, and have been transcribed and annotated for this volume. (shrink)

A. N. Prior; XIV—Time, Existence and Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 183–192, https://doi.org/10.1093/.

The John Locke Lectures for 1955-6, delivered at the University of Oxford.

The man who is isolated over against God is as such rejected by God. But to be this man can only be the choice of the Godless man himself. The witness of the Community of God to every individual man points in this direction: that this choice of the Godless is null and void, that he belongs to Jesus Christ from eternity and thus is not rejected, but rather chosen by God in Jesus Christ, that the reprobation which he deserves (...) on the basis of his wrong choice is borne and removed by Jesus Christ; that on the basis of the true, the Divine choice he is chosen for eternal life with God. The promise of his election will determine him as a member of the Church to become himself a carrier of its witness to the whole world. And the revelation of his rejection can determine him only to believe in Jesus Christ as Him by whom it is borne and removed. (Fourth of Karl Barth's "main theses" on God's Election of Grace in his Dogmatic II/2). (shrink)

Before taking this book with the seriousness which at least parts of it deserve, it is necessary to dispose of a criticism which is basically frivolous but has already been made too often to be ignored. “Contemporary British Philosophy”—the title conjures up the names that everyone is currently bandying about ; and then you find with a jolt that you are being served with fare by such cooks as Ewing, Findlay, Kneale, Mabbott, Price, and—of all people—Paton. People, clearly, who for (...) the most part wouldn’t even pretend to be “contemporary” in the ordinary use of this word, and who indeed in these very papers subject the real “contemporary” philosophers to endless sniping and sharp-shooting. Almost the only contributor one can imagine wishing to be thought “contemporary” is Ryle; and even he—well, did Freud really think of himself as a Freudian? Ayer might be put up as another exception, but that would be shallow— there's no one so completely and hopelessly out of date as the conductor of the bandwagon that's just gone past. Even from the point of view of crass physical age, the baby of this bunch , works out at about 43. (shrink)

We can best begin from Wilson's "simple little puzzle" about Caesar and Antony: "What would the world be like if Julius Caesar had all the properties of Mark Antony and Mark Antony had all the properties of Julius Caesar?" Wilson's own approach to an answer is indirect--he begins by telling us not what such a world would be like but what it would look like. "Clearly the world would look exactly the same under our supposition." But this assumes that the (...) question "What would such a world look like?" is a proper one; which it surely is not. For his answer to it is meaningless until he specifies to whom this supposed world would look as he says it would. It would look exactly the same to him or to me; but would it have looked the same to Caesar or to Antony? In fact Julius Caesar had the experiences of being called "Julius Caesar," being murdered on the Ides of March, and so on, and these are very different experiences from being called "Mark Antony," dallying on the Nile with Cleopatra, and so on; so I don't see how this alternative course of events could possibly have looked the same to Julius Caesar; or--using a similar line of argument--to Mark Antony. So I cannot agree that, as Wilson goes on to say, "our attempt to describe a distinct possible world has produced just the same old world all over again." I am not, indeed, convinced that even a world which looked to everyone just as the actual one does would necessarily be the same world ; but even putting this doubt aside, since the world mentioned wouldn't look to everyone as the actual world does, it wouldn't be the same even by Wilson's own standards. (shrink)

It is frequently said that words like ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘ago’, ‘present’, ‘past’, ‘future’ and the various indications of tense, are ‘egocentric’ or ‘token-reflexive’ in character. I want to suggest, on the contrary, that the apparent egocentricity or token-reflexiveness of this class of expression is deceptive. It is perhaps not easy to see how on a point of this sort deception is possible, but a parallel case may make the position clearer.

Sufficient texts show that for aristotle the universal notion expresses the same real thing as the particular, Though in a different way. His grounds for a universal so conceived are twofold. First, In every sensible thing there is a basic formal principle that, Though individual, Brings each instance into formal identity with all the other instances. Secondly, In human intellectual cognition there is an active principle that raises knowledge above the status of photographing or registering or cataloguing, And actualizes what (...) was only potential in the real thing. In knowing sensible things universally, The human intellect is able to grasp the concrete thing as characterized by a formal nature, Thereby knowing it in a way that holds equally for all other instances. Though patently incomplete, This conception of the universal is free from internal contradictions. It provides a framework for fruitful discussion, And remains a challenge. (shrink)